Abstract. We present n ew attacks on key schedules of block c i p h ers.
Introduction
A k ey schedule is an algorithm that e x p a n ds a relatively short master key (typically between 40 and 256 bits long) to a relatively large expanded key (typically several hundred or thousand b i t s) for later use in an encryption and d ecryption algorithm. Key schedules are used in several ways:
a. To specify the round k eys of a product cipher. DES NBS77] uses its k ey schedule in this way, a s d o m any o t her product ciphers. b. To i n i t ialize some xed elements of a cryptographic transform. Khufu Mer91], Blow sh Sch94], and SEAL RC94] u s e a k ey schedule this way. c. To initialize the s t ate of a stream cipher prior to g e n erating k eystream. RC4 Sch96] uses a key schedule in this way. Note t hat (b) and (c) are the only instances where synchronous stream ciphers can fall prey to a n y c hosen-input a ttack.
In this paper, we present n ew attacks on key schedules. In Section 2, we s u mmarize existing cryptanalysis of key schedules and e x t end some o f t hose results. In Section 3, we i n troduce and m o t ivate r e l a ted-key cryptanalysis. Section 4 describes several new related-key attacks against a variety of algorithms. Finally in Section 5, we brie y discuss the d esign of good key schedules.
Attacks on Key Schedules
In this section, we present s e v eral previous attacks on key schedules. While many of these attacks cannot break the u nderlying algorithms in all forms, they show a \ t heoretical weakness" which m ay be exploited in certain circumstances.
Meet-in-the-Middle A ttacks
Meet-in-the-middle attacks occur when the rst part of a cipher depends upon a di erent set of key bits t han does the s e c o n d part. This allows an attacker to attack t he t wo p a r t s i n dependently, a n d w orks against double-encryption with a block cipher and t wo di erent k eys MH81, OW91, O W95].
Linear Factors
A linear factor is a xed set of key bits w h ose complementation leaves the X OR of a xed set of ciphertext bits u nchanged this weakness can be used to s p e e d up an exhaustive k ey search. Six-round DES has a linear factor CE86].
Weak Keys
A w eak key, K, i s a k ey for which encryption is the s a m e f u nction as decryption. A pair of semi-weak keys, K and K 0 , are keys for which encryption with K is the same a s d ecryption with K 0 and v i c e v ersa. Both DES and L O K I 8 9 h ave w eak keys Dav83, C o p86, MS87, K n u93a]. 1 If the n umb e r o f w eak keys is relatively small, they may not compromise the cipher when used to assure con dentiality. However, several hash modes use block ciphers where an attacker can choose the key input i n a n a ttempt to n d a c o l l i s i o n i n t hese modes the block cipher should not have a n y w e a k o r s e m i -w eak keys.
Detectable Key Classes
One w ay to r e d uce the e e c t ive k eyspace is to divide t he k eyspace into classes, and t hen nd a n a ttack t hat r e v eals to w h i c h class the k ey belongs. In some instances, the w orkload of identifying a k ey with a speci c class is very small these too are sometimes referred to a s w eak keys.
For example, certain keys in Blow sh Sch94] result i n i d entical S-box e n tries, and can be detected in reduced-round v ariants V au96]. IDEA LMM91] h as several classes of keys detectable with j u s t t wo c hosen-plaintext encryptions DGV93]. The k ey schedule in LOKI91 allows two di erent k eys to h ave s e v eral round k eys in common this reduces the e e c t ive k eyspace by almost a factor of four using 2 33 chosen plaintexts Knu93b]. Due to t he w eak mixing i n i t s k ey schedule, RC4 has a class of detectable keys Roo95]. One o u t o f 2 5 6 k eys are detectable, and a d etectable key has about a 13.8% chance of revealing 1 6 b i t s o f the k ey in the rst output b yte. Lucifer has di erential characteristics which a r e conditional on the k ey BB93].
RC5
The following i s a n ew detectable key class attack o n R C5 Riv95]. Suppose all but t he rst pair of RC5 subkeys has only 0 bits i n t heir low 5 b i t p o s i t ions. This is a weak key, because it is possible (with 1 0 2 4 t r i e s ) t o get a plaintext value that n ever rotates. To c heck for a weak key of this kind, let If we h ave a w eak key of this kind, we get some i whose output XOR is (e 0 0 0 f 0 0 0) where e and f are random bytes. This has to b e t he case if we don't get any r o t ation, since nothing e l s e i n t he cipher could propagate to t he right. Any r o t ation, however small, anywhere, will destroy t his property.
If the s u bkey expansion function were random, we w ould have a probability of choosing a w eak key of 2 ;10R
, w h ere R is the n umber of weak-subkey rounds. (Rivest de nes one \ r o u nd" of RC5 as two rounds, i.e. applications, of the F eistel function.) For R = 4 , t his is large enough to be of concern for R = 1 2 t he chances of getting a w eak key at r a n dom are about 2 ;120
. H o wever, we n eed to worry about t his attack i f w e try to build hash functions out o f R C5 with almost any R.
Simple Relations and Equivalent K eys
A simple relation occurs between two di erent k eys, manifesting i t self as a relationship between the r e s u l ting plaintexts a n d c i p h ertexts K n u94]. This also allows the k eyspace to b e r e d uced in a search. DES and LOKI have a simple relation known as the complementation property: if K encrypts P to C, t hen the bitwise complement o f K encrypts t he b i t wise complement o f P to t he b i t wise complement o f C. T h i s r e d uces the e e c t ive k eyspace by o n e bit. DES and LOKI have pairs of keys for which a simple relation exists, for at least a fraction of all plaintexts K n u95a]. Kwan and Pieprzyk describe a technique for locating complementation properties in linear key schedules KP93]. Two k eys are equivalent i f t hey transform all plaintexts i d entically. This can be considered a special kind of simple relation.
TEA TEA WN95] is an easy-to-memorize Feistel block c i p h er. It has a 128-bit master key K 0::3 , a n d t he k ey schedule is simple: all odd rounds use K 0 K 1 as the r o u nd s u bkey, a n d a l l e v en rounds use K 2 K 3 . 2 One cycle of TEA applied to the b l o c k Y i Z i performs
where the r o u nd f u nction F is
Consider complementing t he most signi cant bits o f K 0 and K 1 . N o t e t hat ipping t he most signi cant bit propagates through both t he addition and X OR operations, and i p ping i t t wice cancels the modi cation. Therefore, modifying the 128-bit master key in this way does not e ect the encryption process. We can also complement t he most signi cant b i t s o f K 2 K 3 without a n y e ect. This means that e a c h TEA key has 3 other equivalent k eys. In particular, it is easy to construct collisions for TEA when used in a Davies-Meyer hashing m o d e Win84].
Attacks on One-Wayness
A k ey schedule is one-way if, given several round s u bkeys, it is infeasible for an attacker to g a i n a n y n ew information about t he m aster key or about o t her unknown round s u bkeys. For instance, recovering a few round s u bkeys allows one to recover most of the m aster key in the DES key schedule Biham and S h amir exploited this to o ptimize their di erential attack on DES BS93b]. Furthermore, it may be easier to n d w eak keys and related keys for key schedules which a r e not one-way.
3 Introduction to R e l a ted-Key Cryptanalysis A related-key attack i s o n e w h ere the a ttacker learns the encryption of certain plaintext not only under the original (unknown) key K, b u t also under some derived keys K 0 = f(K). In a chosen-related-key attack, the a ttacker speci es how t he k ey is to b e c hanged known-related-key attacks are those where the k ey di erence is known but cannot be chosen by t he a ttacker. We e m p h asize that t he attacker knows or chooses the r e l a tionship between keys, but not the a c t ual key values.
Overview of General Techniques
The simplest related-key attack treats t he cipher as a black b o x. Winternitz and Hellman show t hat b y obtaining t he encryption of a single chosen plaintext under 2 n chosen keys, n k, o n e m ay recover the k ey values with 2 k;n o ine t r i a l encryptions, if the cipher uses k-bit keys WH87]. This attack easily extends to a probabilistic known-key attack w i t h similar complexities, and s h ows that any cipher has strength o f a t m o s t 2 k=2 against the n aive b l a c k b o x a ttack, if related-key queries are not much more expensive t han chosen-plaintext queries.
Biham introduced a form of related-key cryptanalysis of product ciphers based on rotating t he r o u nd s u bkeys Bih94]. Grossman One v ery useful cryptanalytic technique considers a di erential attack i n which t he k eys, as well as the plaintexts, are chosen with speci c di erences. Given a vulnerable key schedule, we can often insert a chosen di erence into the middle of a cipher, rather than having t o p a s s t hrough all rounds of the cipher. This formulation appears to b e n o vel, though some earlier work K n u95b] implicitly used this ty p e o f m ethod.
Motivation and Impact
Related-key cryptanalysis has commonly been considered a powerful, but strictly theoretical, attack. We believe t hat t his view is inaccurate a n d t hat r e l a ted-key cryptanalysis is of practical interest as well. Certain real-world cryptographic implementations may allow f o r r e l a ted-key cryptanalysis. Secure communications protocols sometimes use K to encrypt in one direction and K in the r e v erse direction. At least one m essage encryption program uses K, K + 1 , K + 2 , e t c., to encrypt a series of messages. 3 Implementations like t hese inadvertently allow for related-key attacks.
We admit that t he m o s t o b vious method for performing related-key attacks is rather impractical. In the straightforward approach, an adversary (an insider, perhaps?) must somehow m anage to c hange the k ey in a predictable manner only then will it be possible to m o u nt a r e l a ted-key query. T h e adversary is assumed to h ave w r i t e-access to t he k ey, b u t not read-access to t he k ey or the protected plaintexts. Because of these strong (and s t r a n ge) requirements, this naive scenario should not be a concern in most practical applications.
However, it is not safe to dismiss related-key cryptanalysis on the basis of this analysis alone. The following sections explain why w e believe t hat r e l a ted-key vulnerabilities can yield practical attacks on real cryptographic applications.
Attacks on Key Exchange Protocols
We p r e s e n t a n ew attack o n k ey exchange protocols which m ay allow a n a d v ersary to mount r e l a ted-key queries on the u nderlying cipher. Suppose Alice and B o b are attempting t o exchange a session key for bulk encryption after the protocol 3 These implementations are proprietary, a n d no references are available.
run Alice receives a secret K A and Bob receives a secret K B , a n d i n a s u ccessful run K A = K B . A n a d v ersary may attack t his setup by t ampering w i t h t he k eyexchange protocol messages, so that K A K B have a known or chosen relation (but K A 6 = K B , in general). After this attack, when Alice encrypts p l a i n text to Bob, Bob will not receive t he correct message but will nd random garbage upon decryption. Under a known-plaintext assumption, the a d v ersary can receive t he decryption of C under both K A and K B , f o r m any r a n dom values of C. This is not an unreasonable assumption we can easily imagine t hat B o b m ay be willing to disclose his garbage (decrypted plaintext) for debugging p u r p o s e s w h en the key exchange fails. Furthermore, if the a d v ersary can modify ciphertext en route it is possible to mount di erential attacks with c o n trol over the di erence entering the k ey and t he ciphertext ports. In the e n d , a k ey-exchange protocolisvulnerable to t his attack i f i t d o e s n o t p r o vide i n tegrity protection for the s h ared secret it exchanges. For example, a protocol which distributes a session key K s between Alice and Bob, who s h are a long-term key K ab , b y s e n ding A ! B : E(K ab ) K s will be vulnerable since an adversary can ip bits i n K s at will.
To d emonstrate t his protocol attack, we examine t he 2PKDP key distribution are nonces, K ab is a long-term symmetric shared key between A and B, a n d K s is the n egotiated session key. W e note t hat a n a d v ersary can easily ip bits i n t he second message to ip corresponding b i t s i n K s and t hereby m o u nt o n e related-key query. I t i s i n teresting t o note t hat t he a uthors (incorrectly) believed that k ey integrity w as not a necessary goal for a key distribution protocol. 4 Our attack shows that, when the c i p h er is vulnerable to r e l a ted-key attacks (as most are), key integrity i s v i t al. 5 Though these examples have used symmetric-key protocols, one s h ould not assume t hat a p u blic-key protocol is inherently safer. For instance, if session keys are encrypted under an RSA key (e n) w i t hout completely padding all the u nused input bits, an adversary can shift the k ey over j bits b y m ultiplying t he R S A ciphertext by 2 ej mod n t his shift may create exactly the s o r t o f k ey di erence needed for a key rotation attack. 6 4 Furthermore, their optional protocol extension for key integrity c a n f a i l w h en there are related keys K K 0 such t hat EK (P) = E K 0 (P) h olds with high probability. 5 Other researchers, e.g. MB94] , have a l s o n o t ed the n eed for message integrity protection in key distribution protocols. 6 Standard public key schemes such a s P K CS PKCS] a n d Bellare-Rogaway BR94] use padding a n d t hus are not vulnerable to t his sort of attack.
Key exchange protocols may also be vulnerable when they transmit some k ey data a s s a l t i n t he clear (perhaps to a void dictionary attacks), since this practice gives an adversary some control over the i n p u t t o t he bulk cipher key schedule.
As stated, the protocol attacks provide o n l y o n e related-key query. T o o b t ain multiple related-key queries, the a d v ersary could try to a ttack s e v eral sessions but all those failed key exchanges will probably be noticed, so it may be very di cult t o obtain too many r e l a ted-key queries. Alternatively, a ttacking n-party key distribution (such as secure conferencing a n d m ulticasting) protocols may yield up to n ; 1 r e l a ted-key queries again, this is not practical for large values of n. I n t his context, then, we can conclude t hat related-key queries should be considered very expensive ( t hough not infeasible) to o b t ain. A block cipher which succumbs to a n a ttack r e q u i r i n g j u s t o n e related-key and 2 32 known plaintexts should be very worrisome an attack n eeding 2 32 chosen keys seems impractical.
Attacks on Hash Functions
Probably the most relevant context for related-key cryptanalysis is the d esign of hash functions. Typically, h ash functions are constructed from an underlying block cipher often a Davies-Meyer type structure is used, so that t he m essage input feeds into t he block cipher's key. T h i s s e t up is ideal for related-key cryptanalysts: a related-key query on the block cipher requires just one o -l i n e chosen-message trial hash computation in this model, so a related-key weakness in the b l o c k c i p h er could easily weaken the h ash function severely. I n o t her words, for hash functions, related-key queries are cheap|usually cheaper than chosenplaintext queries. Accordingly, h ash functions must rely on the u nderlying block cipher to h ave an exceedingly strong k ey schedule.
4 New Related-Key Attacks 4.1 GOST GOST GOST89] is an excellent example of a cipher that w as designed to r e s i s t rotating-subkey related-key attacks but not related-key di erential cryptanalysis. Let K 0::7 be the e i g h t 32-bit words of the k ey. GOST is a 32-round F eistel cipher the k ey schedule generates round s u bkeys sk 0::31 according t o sk i = K i mod 8 if i < 24 K 7;i mod 8 otherwise Note t hat a non-zero K 0 di erence gets i n troduced into o n l y sk 0 s k 8 s k 16 and sk 31 t he di erence sk 0 can be handled by t he s t andard trick o f o s e t ting t he rst round k ey di erence with a n a p propriately chosen plaintext di erence. This approach allows us to b ypass the r s t e i g h t r o u nds for free.
GOST's F-function is based on the parallel application of eight 4-bit wide bijective S-boxes, followed by a left rotation of 11 bits. This means that i t i s possible to a ttack GOST with a triple of one-round c haracteristics A ! B by F, B ! C, a n d C ! A (here A B C are 32-bit di erences), where each o n eround c haracteristic has just one a c t ive S -b o x. 7 In more detail, let A be an input di erence with j u s t o n e a c t ive S-box a n d w i t h o n l y t he high-order bit set in the input di erence to t hat S-box. Choose B so that A ! B and t he l o w bit of active S-box's output di erence is zero. The r o u nd f u nction rotates the o u tput di erence left by 1 1 b i t s, which p u ts t he t hree non-zero bits o f B into o n e S -b o x's input i n t he s e c o n d r o u nd. This second r o u nd i s c o vered with B ! C by a similar technique the a c t ive S-box's output di erence should be zero in the high three bits, so that w e can cover the t hird round w i t h C ! A. 8 If the probability of all three of these relationships is p, a n d t hey are allowed to o verlap (which is reasonable, as A, B, a n d C are each no more than four bits wide), then we c a n c hoose a key di erence of A, get a 20-round c haracteristic with probability p 32 , a n d carry out a 4 R a ttack on 32-round GOST. This analysis will only be practical when the S -b o xes have a v ery bad di erence distribution, since when p < 2 We examinedthe security o f t he \ s t andard" set of GOST S-boxes Sch96]: we estimate t hat t he 12-round c haracteristic has probability a bout 2 ;68 , which i s t oo low t o m ake t he a ttack practical. Randomly chosen S-boxes were much w eaker. The a verage probability o ver 10000 random S-boxes was 2 
IDEA
IDEA LMM91] is an eight-round block c i p h er with a 64-bit block a n d a 128-bit key. E a c h r o u nd k ey is 96 bits l o n g there is also a nal output transformation which uses a 64 bit round k ey. IDEA's key schedule is very simple. To g e n erate 6n + 4 16-bit subkey words for a n-round I D E A v ariant, a 128-bit register is lled with t he k ey. T h e r s t 1 6 b i t s are taken for the r s t s u bkey word, the n ext for the second, and so on, until all eight 16-bit words in the register are taken. The register is then rotated left 25 bits, and t he process is repeated until all the required subkey words have b e e n t aken.
Because of the simple key schedule, there is a chosen-key di erential attack on 3-round IDEA. This attack can recover 32 bits o f k ey using six chosen plaintexts|two u nder the rst key, four under the s e c o n d. Recovering a n o t her 64 7 The a n alysis is complicated by t he f a c t t hat t he GOST S-boxes may vary in di erent implementations, so we will describe a general approach for cryptanalysis. 8 Note t hat t here are many o t her possible ways to p u s h c haracteristics through GOST.
bits o f t he k ey requires another 2 17 chosen plaintexts u nder the t hird key, l e a ving us with 32 bits t o r e c o ver by exhaustive search.
There is also a chosen-key ciphertext-only timing a ttack on full eight-round IDEA. It requires 5 2 17 related-key queries, each u s e d t o encrypt 2 20 random, unknown plaintext blocks. We m u s t b e a ble to m easure the t ime t o perform each aggregate o f 2 20 encryptions to an accuracy of one second.
The A ttack o n 3 -R o u nd IDEA We rst observe t hat t he only subkeys used in IDEA-3 that are di erent f o r K and for K 2 103 are subkeys 1 and 1 5 ( n umbering from 0). This allows us to recover 32 bits o f t he k ey by e n c r y p t ing A 0 and A 1 under K, a n d A 0 + 2 9 , A 0 ;2 9 , A 1 + 2 9 , a n d A 1 ;2 9 under K 2 103 . D e p e n ding on the initial value of key bit 103, one o r t he o t her adjustment t o A 0 and A 1 will cancel out t he c hange to s u bkey 1. For either the + 2 9 or ;2 9 values, there will usually be only one p a i r o f v alues for subkeys 18 and 2 0 t hat are consistent w i t h the o u tput di erences. 9 Extending t he a ttack requires encrypting a bout 2 16 di erent quadruples under K 2 127 , corresponding t o t he possible di erent v alues of subkey 1. For one o f these quadruples, we will usually have o n l y o n e p a i r o f v alues for subkeys 19 and 21 consistent w i t h t he o u tput di erences. From this, not only have w e l e a r n ed some information about t he v alue of subkey 1, we can also carry out a further attack t o recover subkeys 16 and 17. With k n o wledge of the last four subkeys, we can look at t he inputs t o t he MA-box i n t he last round. We can then verify, for each o f t he 2 32 possible values for subkeys 16 and 1 7 , w h ether these subkey values are consistent w i t h t he input a n d o u tput di erences, which w e can see directly. W e will usually nd o n l y o n e s u ch v alue for these two s u bkeys.
Related-Key Di erential Timing A ttacks Koc96] cryptanalyzes several important cryptosystems by t iming t heir operation. We present a relatively simple chosen-key timing a ttack on IDEA. It exploits t he f a c t t hat t he t otal time t o encrypt a large number of random blocks of data with I D E A i s a f u ncti o n o f t he total number of zero multiplicative s u bkeys. 10 On a 33 MHz 486SX, we h ave m easured that increasing t he n umb e r o f z e r o multiplicative s u bkeys by o n e d ecreases the t ime required to c a r r y o u t 1,000,000 block encryptions by a n a verage of 3 seconds. This allows an attacker to d etermine whether a given chang e i n a k ey has caused the t otal number of zero subkeys to go up, go down, or stay the same.
The I D E A a ttack t akes advantage of this observation, as follows. First, request the encryption of about 2 20 random plaintexts ( s u ch a s w e w ould expect to get from CBC, OFB64, or CFB64 modes) under key K, a n d r e c o r d t he elapsed time t o w i t hin one second 11 as T 0 . C o n tinue to record similar timings T i for each key K i for all 16-bit values of i. Next, x a 128-bit value MASK which h as all but t he l o w 1 6 b i t s set, and request the t imings T 12 4.3 SAFER K-64 SAFER K-64 is a 6-round block cipher whose round f u nction combines the i n p u t with a r o u nd s u bkey, a p plies eight parallel 8-bit permutation S-boxes, combines the r e s u l t w i t h another subkey, a n d e n ds with a di usion layer Mas94]. The key schedule rotates the ith m aster key byte a n d a d d s a c o n s t ant t o o b t ain the ith b yte o f e a c h r o u nd s u bkey therefore master key byte i a ects only the input a n d o u tput of S-box i in every round. Knudsen shows that t his regularity in the SAFER K-64 key schedule causes serious weaknesses in the block cipher Knu95b]. He nds a related-key attack w h i c h h as a 1=73 probability of recovering 8 k ey bits given one c hosen related-key query and 2 30 {2 36 chosen plaintexts.
We believe t hat K n udsen's di erential attack can be optimized by u s i n g s t andard ideas from di erential cryptanalysis BS93a]. Adop t a 1 R a ttack, so that t he di erential characteristic covers rounds 2{5 the rst round can be bypassed by using s t r u ctures of 2 8 plaintexts, as Knudsen suggested in Knu95b] . This 4-round c haracteristic has probability a p proximately 2 ;23 to 2 ;28 (when the k ey di erence is favorable, which h appens about 1 =73 of the t ime) and S=N ratio of at least 2 11 . If just one c hosen related-key query is available, we expect this to h ave a bout a 1 =73 probability of recovering a bout 2 8 k ey bits a f t er 2 24 {2 29 chosen plaintexts. 13 With a structure of 2 8 chosen related-key queries, we p r e d i c t this will nd a bout 2 8 k ey bits (with v ery high probability) after approximately 2 24 {2 29 total chosen plaintexts.
SAFER K-64 is weak against related-key cryptanalysis because its k ey schedule has little avalanche a n d g e n erates all round s u bkeys in nearly the s a m e w ay. SAFER SK is a variant w i t h a n u p d ated key schedule, designed to increase its avalanche qualities it is not vulnerable to t he r e l a ted-key attack d escribed above Knu95b].
11 These numbers re ect the m achine a n d implementation used for the experiment| other machines and implementations may change these signi cantly. F or example, improved time r e s o l u tion will decrease the n umber of ciphertexts needed. 12 Alternatively, o n e could continue to r e c o ver multiplicative s u bkeys in this way until all 128 bits of K are known. 13 The 1 R a ttack a l l o ws one t o extract more information about t he last round s u bkey from a right pair than Knudsen's 0R attack does.
DES with I n dependent R o u nd S u bkeys
A 768-bit DES variant uses independent r o u nd s u bkeys Ber83]. This variant will be much w eaker in some s i t uations: there is a very simple related-key attack needing just 15 related keys and 6 0 c hosen plaintexts. Obtain the encryptions E(k p) a n d E(k 0 p ), where k 0 is obtained from k by i p ping s o m e bits i n t he last round s u bkey this can be thought o f a s a d i e r e n tial 1R attack with a characteristic of probability 1 . T h e last round s u bkey can be recovered with f o u r chosen plaintexts, and t hen we can peel o the last round a n d repeat t he a ttack on 15-round D E S . T h i s a ttack can also be optimized for the c a s e w h en related key queries are very expensive t o a c hieve a complexity o f o n e related key and 2 16 or so chosen plaintexts. For nearly any p r o d uct block cipher, if it's possible to ip bits in a cipher's expanded key, it's possible to m o u nt a n X OR di erential attack o n t he last round o f t he c i p h er. This may be useful in attacking s o m e systems that leave expanded keys vulnerable to c hange.
G-DES
G-DES PA90a, P A90b] is a DES variant w i t h i n dependent r o u nd s u bkeys. The authors foresee di culty i f i t i s u s e d f o r h ashing (such a s a D a vies-Meyer construction), so they specify two special modes for use as a one-way function. Both modes use 16 G-DES encryptions, with t he 768-bit message block a s t he k ey the r s t m o d e i t erates encryptions serially to a n i n i t ial constant p l a i n text block, while the second m o d e a p plies them in parallel to 16 initial constants. Both hashing m o d es can be broken by a trivial related-key di erential attack w h i c h modi es part of the last round s u bkey: at m o s t 2 32 trial encryptions su ce to nd collisions. The a uthors did not envision any di culty u s i n g G-DES for condentiality, b u t our analysis of DES with i n dependent r o u nd s u bkeys show t hat G-DES is also vulnerable to r e l a ted-key attacks in these applications.
Three-Key Triple-DES
Three-key triple-DES is a well-known method for strengthening DES with a 168-bit key it is also susceptible to r e l a ted-key attacks. This mode can be considered a 3-round cipher with i n dependent 56-bit round s u bkeys, realizing t hat each round i s v ery strong. Naively, o n e might use rotational related-key cryptanalysis however, such a n a p proach w ould require many k n o wn plaintexts.
There is a better related-key attack on triple-DES. Denote t he triple-DES encryption of P under key K = ( k a k b k c ) b y C = E(k c E ;1 (k b E (k a P ))): A related key-pair will be
where is an arbitrary xed known constant. Once we h ave a known-plaintext pair 14 P C for the k ey K, w e obtain the d ecryption of C under key K 0 to o b t ain P 0 = E ;1 (k a E(k a P )) now e x h austive search will recover k a in 2 56 encryptions. After that, one c a n n d k b k c with a m eet-in-the-middle attack o n d o u ble-DES, which h as complexity o f a p proximately 2 56 to 2 72 MH81, O W91, OW95]. In total, we n eed one c hosen related-key query, o n e c hosen-ciphertext query, a n d 2 56 {2 72 o ine trial encryptions.
Note t his attack does not work against two-key triple-DES, and i s t he r s t attack for which t wo-key triple-DES is stronger than three-key triple-DES.
ECB+OFB
Matt Blaze proposed a double-DES variant B l a 9 3 ], as follows:
M n+1 = E(K 1 M n ) M 0 = IV C n = E(K 2 M n P n ) It was intended as a stronger replacement for single DES for use in a cryptographic lesystem. This scheme i s a l s o v u l n erable to r e l a ted key attack. Obtain a known plaintext pair P C encrypted under key K = ( K 1 K 2 ), and o b t ain the c hosen ciphertext decryption P 0 of C under the r e l a ted key K 0 = ( K 1 K 2 ), where is a known constant. Since P 0 P = OFB(K 1 I V ) OFB(K 1 IV ), exhaustive s e a r c h will recover K 1 with 2 56 trial encryptions, and t hen K 2 follows with another exhaustive search. In total, the a ttack requires one related-key query, o n e c hosenciphertext query, a n d 2 57 trial encryptions.
Note t hat Blaze's encrypting lesystem Bla94] a c t ually implements a modication of this mode the d eployed mode i s r e s i s t ant t o o u r a ttack.
Designing Strong K ey Schedules
Two basic approaches prevent related-key attacks on a cryptosystem. First, one may provide p r o t ection in the high-level protocol. To t his end, we p r o pose the following explicit design principle: key exchange protocols should guarantee the integrity (not just the con dentiality) of exchanged k e y s .
In the s e c o n d a p proach, one prevents related-key attacks against the cipher by immunizing t he k ey schedule against related-key attacks. To t hat e n d, we recommend t hat d esigners maximize avalanche in the subkeys and avoid linear key schedules. Every key bit should a ect nearly every round, if possible, but not in exactly the s a m e w ay also the k ey schedule should be designed to resist di erential attacks. This type of approach w as adopted by SEAL RC94] a n d Blow sh Sch94] , and suggested in Knu94] , and r e s u l ted in strong k ey schedules. The k ey schedules of FEAL SM88] a n d R C5 Riv95] also resist related-key cryptanalysis.
As an open question, we n o t e t hat t he DES key schedule is linear, and w onder why i t a p pears to resist related-key attacks.
If you are already using a k ey schedule that m ay be vulnerable, we recommend the following d esign principle: pass the key through a cryptographically strong hash function before sending it to the key schedule. Of course, this technique will make t he algorithm less attractive for use as a hash function.
Ideally, d esigners should adopt both t he protocol-level and cipher-level approaches simultaneously, p r o viding d efense in depth.
